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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
by such cases as that allowing as an extraordinary and necessary business
expense, amounts contributed by a corportaion for construction of a city hos-
pital where two-thirds of the citizens were employees of the corporation."2
Twenty-nine states have adopted statutes which further define a corpora-
tion's power to make donations.13 Some require that the gift must contribute
to public welfare, civic betterment or charitable purposes. 4 Others permit
gifts to a restricted class of recipients, with a general power to make dona-
tions for the public Welfare but with restrictions on the funds that may be
used, or the percentage of net income that may be given. 15 Oklahoma has
given perhaps the greatest freedom of donative power; under its statute the
directors of a corporation may make gifts to charitable enterprises if in their
judgment the public interest will be served or the corporation itself will
benefit.";
Since the enactment of this type of legislation, the gifts from corporations
have risen from thirty to two hundred sixty million dollars a year.' 7 This
clearly indicates the value of such legislation.
INSANE PERSONS - DUE PROCESS OF LAW - NON-JUDICIAL COMMIT'MENT
OF MENTALLY ILL IN NON-EMERGENCY CASES. - Proceeding in mandamus
to compel the admission of a mentally ill individual to a state mental hospital.
Admission had been refused on the grounds that the commitment procedure
under the Missouri statute 1 was violative of the due process clauses of the
state2 and federal constitutions. 3 The statute provided for the non-judicial
commitment of the mentally ill. By its terms the alleged insane person could
]w committed for an indefinite term upon the application of a friend, relative,
or health officer and the submission of a certificate signed by two doctors
stating that the individual was mentally ill and a danger to himself and the
community. The statute further provided for a hearing on appeal if de-
manded by either the patient, guardian or relative. The court held that the
Missouri staute violated due process in denying the individual his right to
to hearing and notice before commitment. State ex tel. Fuller v. Mullinax,
269 S.W. 2d 72, (Mo. 1954).
Little uniformity exists in either statutory provisions or judicial decisions
with respect to the commitment proceeding. 4 The difficulty in classifying
the nature of the action, whether it is primarily criminal, civil or of hybrid
form, and the use of judicial procedure in some jurisdictions and administra-
12. Corning Glass Works v. Lucas, 37 F. 2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1929), cert. denied 281
U.S. 742 (1930).
13. Ballantine, Corporations §85 (1946); Bell, Corporation Support of Education:
The Legal Basis, 38 A.B.A.J 119 (1952).
14. Ark. Laws 1951, c. 69. Cal. Laws 1951, c. 564.
15. Va. Laws 1950, c. 574 p. 1309. New York Laws 1949 c. 171, J 14:3-13.
16. Okla. Laws 1949, Title 18, c. A.
17. Bell, Corporation Support of Education: The Legal Basis. 38 A.B.A.J. 119
(1952).
1. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 202.780 to 202.870 (1949).
2. Mo. Const. Art. I § 10.
3. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.
4. Though it is generally agreed that the hearing on insanity is not a criminal action.
but essentially civil, the fact that there is no adverse party makes classification difficult.
The form may vary from a trial before judge and jury, or hearing before a judge alone.
to a hearing before a county commission composed of a judge, doctor and lawyer. N.D.
Rev. Code J 25-0301 (1943).
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tiveprocedure in others, leaves few general requirements and only one uni-
versal requirement: that of due process. 5
Except for an emergency commitment, where the individual is temporarily
confined pending hearing on the question of insanity 6 the traditional pro-
cedure has been judicial in nature, 7 consisting of notice and hearing on the
question of insanity followed by commitment to an institution for an indefi-
nite term. 8 However, commitment by this method has been severely criti-
cized. 9 . Its similarity to criminal prosecution 10 and the strict application of
stitutional safeguards seemingly frustrate its very purpose. 1 The require-
ment of notice, the publicity surrounding the hearing, and the penal conno-
tations of the action not only tend to deter the seeking of state aid, but can
do serious harm to one whose mind is already weakened and diseased. 1 -
Cognizance of this has led to noteworthy developments. Some states have
i:bolished trial by jury,'- and the majority have made it optional. 14 -In others
personal service 5 and actual presence at the hearing can be waived.
15
Satisfaction of due process does not necessarily involve proceedings judicial
;n nature.' 7 The procedure may be adapted to the necessities of the case.""
It appears then, that a non-judicial proceeding is valid as long as notice and
and opportunity for a hearing are given.
In the attempt to avoid excessive legalism and afford procedure consistent
with sound therapeutic practice, the Missouri statute'0 not only provides
for non-judicial procedure, but contemplates a serious break from tradition by
making notice and hearing no longer necessary unless requested on appeal.
Such a departure however, is not without precedent. Several states have pro-
cedures of essentially the same nature, and local courts have held them
.5. E.g., Chaloner v. Sherman, 242 U.S. 455 (1917); In Re Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 66
P. 851 (1901); State ex rel. Blaisdell v. Billings, 55 Minn. 467, 57 N.W. 206 (1894);
Bloyston's Appeal, 53 Wise. 612, 11 N.W. 36 (1881).
6. People v; Young, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Shapley v. Cohoon, 258 Fed. 752 (1918);
Nelsen v. Tilly, 137 Neb. 327, 299 N.W. 388 (1939).
7. Dupuy v. Tedora, 204 La. 560, 15 S.2d 886 (1943) (due process demands a
proceeding within the judicial procedure). Note, 56 Yale L.J. 1178 at 1191 (1947).
8. Cases cited note 5, supra.
9. See Weihofen, Commitment of Mental Patients - Proposal to Eliminate Some
Unhappy Features of Our Legal Procedure, 13 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 99, 105 (1941);
Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally I11, 31 N.C.L. Rev. 274 (1953); Note, 3 Stan.
L. Rev. 109 (1950); Note, 12 Pitts. L. Rev. 52 (1950); Note, 56 Yale L.J. 1178 (1953).
10. It is most understandable, though regrettable, that commitment procedure should
pattern criminal procedure. In both, the liberty of the individual is at stake, and fnt
many instances the work of restraining and confining the insane falls upon penal
officers.
11. See note 8, supra; See Curran, supra note 9 at 277, "The traumatic effects
of [present) procedure, which is intended to protect [the insane], may require a great
(teal of care and treatment to overcome."
12. See note 8, supra.
13. In North Dakota hearing is had before a commission. N.D. Rev. Code § 25-0301
(1943).
14. Note, 56 Yale L.J. 1178 at 1192 (1947) Jury trial is mandatory in only Texas
and Miss. . . . In 21 states it is optional. See comprehensive chart at p. 1209).
15. Id at 1194.
16. Id at 1194 (Only about one-half the states require actual presence).
17. Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427 (1901).
18. Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
19. Pub. Health Service Publication No. 51, G.P.O. (1952) (prepared by the Nat.
Institute of Mental Health). Act embodies the basic principles suggested in "The Men-
tal Programs of the Forty-Eight States", The Council of State Governments' Report to
the Governors' Conference (1950).
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to be constitutional. - 0  The conflict revolves around the requirement of
special procedure for the treatment of the mentally ill, and on the other
hand, the maintenance of constitutional safeguards.21 Under non-judicial
commitment the individual is confined without a hearing. 22 However, by
providing the individual with the means of obtaining a hearing subsequent
to confinement, "there is sufficient protection of the liberty of the subject to
meet constitutional requirements".,2
On appeal of a writ of habeas corpus after commitment by a procedure
similar to that of the instant case, a Federal Court of Appeals has held that a
writ of relief cannot be treated as a substitute for original adjudication. To
do so would be to condone deprivation of liberty at least up to the time a
writ can be issued. The court stated that decisions to the contrary were
"wrongly decided".
24
According to the Supreme Court of Maine, 2 3 commitment with hearing
deferred may be justified in an emergency case but extending it to a non-
emergency case amounts to an unauthorized use of the police power. Com-
mitment prior to hearing is objected to on the grounds that due process
contemplates a hearing had in fact, and the mere provision of the means
of obtaining such hearing after commitment makes possible the indefinite
confinement of an individual without a final determination of the question of
sanity. Either through fraud, mistake or inabilty to protect his own interests
person confined may never be given the opportunity to be heard, and
as long as this very real possibility exists such procedure is inherently de-
fective.26
In defense of the deferred hearing procedure, it is argued that due process
is not an issue because the confinement is only temporary.2 7 A Massachusetts
court has stated that "the order of commitment settles nothing finally or
conclusively against the the person committed". 2s The commitment is merely
temporary, for the individual confined will remain there only until he seeks
final adjudication of the question of his sanity. Although Rhode Island had
declared non-judicial commitment unconstitutional,20 the identical commit-
20. Hammon x. Hill, 228 Fed. 999 (D.C. Pa. 1915); In re Dowdell, 169 Mass. 387,
47 N.E. 1033 (1897); Ex parte Dagley, 35 Okla. 180, 128 P. 699 (1912); In re
Crosswell, 28 R.I. 127, 66 Atl. 55 (1907; accord, Corcoran v Jarrel, 185 Iowa 532,
170 N.W. 776 (1919).
21. "The striking of a balance between the requirements for legal safeguards and
medical discretion in medical matter is the great dilemma in the commitment laws
today." Curran, supra, note 13 at 227.
22. Cases cited note 20 supra.
23. In re Dowdell, 169 Mass. 387, 389, 47 N.E. 1033, 1034 (1897).
24. Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d 22, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1938.
25. Appeal of Sleeper, 87 A.2d. 115, 118 (Me. 1952) (The attempt to provide a
single standardized procedure for both non-emergency and emergency commitments
would make possible, by either fraud or mistake, the confinement of a perfectly cane
person without notice or the opportunity to be heard.). This case is criticized in Note,
53 Col. L. Rev. 568 (1953). In re Wellman, 3 Kan. App. 100, 45 Pac. 726, 727(1896) the court stated that, "Every person is entitled to his day in court, and the
right to be heard before he is condemned. It will not do to say that it is useless to serve
notice upon an insane person; that it would avail nothing because of his inability to
take advantage of it. His insanity is the very thing to be tried.." "... the presumption
of law is in favor of sanity. Insanity like crime, does not exist in law, until it is estab-
lished by evidence in a proper proceeding."
26. This is also the basis upon which the court in the instant case declared the Mis-
souri statute unconstitutional. Cf. Barry v. Hall supra note 24.
. 27. In re Dowdell, 169 Mass. 387, 47 N.E. 1033 (1897); In re Crosswell, 28 R.I.
137, 66 Ad. 55 (1907).
28. In re Dowdell, supra note 27 at 388, 47 N.E. at 1033.
29. Doyle Petitioner, 16 R.I. 537, 18 Atd. 159 (1889).
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ment procedure was held valid subsequent to legislation :'o extending the
scope of the writ of habeas corpus to include not only the question of wrong-
ful confinement, but also the determination of the question of insanity. t
In Rhode Island, temporary confiinement without hearing in a non-emergency
case has been held justified on the ground that the nature of the action always
calls for emergency procedure.2
The conflict seems to arise from the divergent interpetations of the concept
of due process, while the importance of the issue stems from the fear of
unjust confinement.:; Nevertheless, the fact of insanity is largely if not
completely a matter of scientific diagnosis,34 and where a finding of insanity
is attested to by qualified physicians,35 the presence or absence of judicial
approval would seem to be of little significance. Though there exists the
possibility of fraudulent confinement in case of dishonesty of the two
attesting physicians, determination of insanity by an appointed body of
qualified psychiatrists would leave little room for serious concern. 3G
It would be unwise to construe due process to mean the strict application
of notice and hearing. No hard and fast rule can be laid down.-, The
welfare of the mentally ill is an all important consideration, and their treat-
ment would seem to call for special procedure consistent with the necessities
of their unfortunate malady.
WILLIAM11 C. KELSCH
INSURANCE - LIABILITY INSURANCE - INJURY ARISING OUT OF UNLOADING
VEHICLE - Plaintiff had insured its delivery truck with defendant. The policy
covered damages for bodily injury caused by accidents arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of the truck. The "use" of the vehicle in-
cluded the "loading and unloading" thereof. In the course of its business
plaintiff delivered a roll of linoleum to a customer. Plaintiff's employee
removed the linoleum from the truck and with the help of another lifted
the roll to the porch of the customer's home. Later the same day, because
of the negligence of plaintiff's employee in placing the linoleum on the porch,
the linoleum fell on the customer's daughter causing serious injury.
Held, the injury was within the provisions of the policy because it arose out
30. R.I. Laws 1896, c. 82 § 19. It should be noted that North Dakota has extended
the application of the writ of habeas corpus to include determination of the question of
insanity. N.D. Rev. Code 25-0328 (1943).
31. In re Crosswell, 28 R.I. 137, 66 Atl. 55 (1907).
32. Cf. id. at 58.
33. Note, 56 Yale L.J. 1178 at 1182 (1947).
34. Curran, supra note 9 at 283; Note 3, Stan. L. Rev. 109 at 110 (1950).
35. In most jurisdictions physicians licensed in general practice are considered quali-
fied experts on insanity. Glover v. State, 129 Ga. 717, 59 S.E. 816 (1907); Holt v.
State, 840 Okla. Crim. 283, 181 P.2d. 573 (1947); Brody v. State, 116 Tex. Crim.
427, 34 SW.2d 587 (1931). However, from within the field of medicine itself comes
strong criticism of this majority rule. The expert psychiatrist considers this unrealistic
in view of the inadequate training of the general practitioner in the field of psychiatry
or in the lack of interest in the subject of mental disorder. See Overholsen, Psychiatric
Expert Testimony in Criminal Cases Since McNaghten-A Review, 42 J. Crim. & Crim-
inology 283, 295 (1951). On the other hand it has been held that the trial judge can
exclude a general practitioner as an expert unless he qualifies by having either special
knowledge or special study in the field of mental illness. McElroy v. State, 146 Tenn.
442, 242 S.W. 883 (1922).
36. An administrative board of qualified psychiatrists as proposed for the State of
California, outlined in Note, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 109 (1950).
37. See Brock v North Carolina, 344 U.S. 428, 427-428 (1953).
